Trivialismus est theoria logica quae proponit omnia dicta (etiam propositiones appellata) vera esse, omnesque contradictiones generis "p et non p" (in exemplo "pila est ruber et non ruber}) veras esse. Secundum quod, trivialista est homo qui credat omnia esse vera.[1][2]

Trivialismus in logica symbolica: lege "ulla propositio data est propositio vera."

Nexus interni

NotaeRecensere

  1. Priest 2007: 131.
  2. Kabay 2010.

Nexus externiRecensere

  Vicimedia Communia plura habent quae ad trivialismum spectant. (hic nexus fractus videtur)

BibliographiaRecensere

  • Kroon, Frederick. 2004. Realism and Dialetheism. In The Law of Non-Contradiction: New Philosophical Essays, ed. Graham Priest, J. C. Beall, et Bradley Armour-Garb. Oxoniae: Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0-19-926517-6
  • Immanuel [sic]. 2014. Instrumentalist Science of Zen Philosophy: Applied Ad Hoc Trivialism. Zen Applied Science.
  • Kabay, Paul. 2010. On the Plenitude of Truth: A Defense of Trivialism. Lambert Academic Publishing. ISBN 978-3-8383-5102-5.
  • Priest, Graham. 2007. Paraconsistency and Dialetheism. In The Many Valued and Nonmonotonic Turn in Logic, ed. Dov M. Gabbay et John Woods, 131. Elsevier. ISBN 978-0-444-51623-7.