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Linea 132: Tomasello vehementius dixit hoc genus eruditionis imitativae niti "penitus filiorum inclinatione ut se eundem esse quam adultos putent<!--Anglice: to identify with adults--> et eorum facultate distinguendi in aliorum actionibus finem celatum et varios modos qui posse adhiberi ut id attingant" (Tomasello 1999:514). Appellat hoc genus eruditionis imitativae "eruditionem culturalem quia filius non solum res ab aliis personis discit: ea etiam discit res per eos; hoc est, ea debet scire aliquid conspectús adulti circumiectorum ut discat usum eiusdem actus ad intentionem pertinentem" (Tomasello 1999:515; Tomasello, Kruger, & Ratner 1993). Tomasello conclusit gravissimam eruditionis culturalis proprietatem esse quod incidit solum cum homo "comprehendit alios esse actores sua sponte sicut se, et eos mundi habent conspectum quem possunt insequitur, dirigere, et partiri” (Tomasello 1999:516). Eruditio aemulativa et eruditio imitativa sunt adaptationes quae possunt aestimari solum in earum maioribus circumiecti evolutionisque "contextibus." Eruditio aemulativa et eruditio imitativa sunt adaptationes quae possunt aestimari solum in earum maioribus circumiecti evolutionisque "contextibus."<!-- In one experiment, chimpanzees and two-year-old children were separately presented with a rakelike tool and an out-of-reach object; adult humans then demonstrated two different ways to use the tool, one more efficient, one less efficient. Chimpanzees used the more efficient method following both demonstrations; most of the human children, however, imitated whichever method the adult was demonstrating. If chimps and humans were compared on the basis of these results, one might think chimpanzees more intelligent. From an evolutionary perspective, they are equally intelligent, but with different kinds of intelligence, adapted to different environments (Nagell, Olguin, & Tomasello 1993). Chimpanzees' learning strategies are well-suited to a relatively stable physical environment, which requires little social cooperation (compared to that of humans). Human learning strategies are well-suited to a complex social environment, in which understanding others' intentions may be more important than success at a specific task. Tomasello argues that this strategy has made possible the [[effectus scalare\|effectum scalare]], which enabled humans to evolve social systems that have enabled them to adapt to almost every physical environment on earth (Tomasello 1999:520–521). Tomasello adds that cultural learning is essential for language-acquisition. Most children in any society, and all children in some, do not learn all words through the direct efforts of adults. “In general, for the vast majority of words in their language, children must find a way to learn in the ongoing flow of social interaction, sometimes from speech not even addressed to them” (Brown 1999). This finding has been confirmed by experiments in which children learned words even when the referent was not present, multiple referents were possible, and the adult was not trying to teach the word to the child directly (Akhtar & Tomasello 1996; Tomasello & Barton 1994; Tomasello, Strosberg, & Akhtar 1996). Tomasello concludes that “a linguistic symbol is nothing other than a marker for an intersubjectively shared understanding of a situation (1999:516). --> Investigationum quae inter discendi rationes primatum humanorum et non humanorum distinxerunt inspectio a Tomasello facta anno [[1999]] adfirmat argumentum a [[Radulphus Holloway\|Radulpho Holloway]], [[Biological anthropologia\|anthropologo biologico]], qui dixit disertum genus "socialitatis" ad symbolicam cognitionem adnexam fuisse "[[clavis\|claves]]" evolutionis humanae, et naturam culturae constituere. Secundum Holloway, gravissima quaestio evolutionis ''[[Homo sapiens\|Hominis sapientis]]''—"[[clavis]]" vere comprehensionis culturae—est "quomodo homo suam experientiam formet." Cultura enim est "impositio formae arbitrariae super circumiectum." Hoc factum, inquit, distinctionem humanarum eruditionis rationum, usus instrumentorum, et linguae praecipue explicat. Humana lingua et instrumentorum fabrica, "elaborationes cognitivas quae sunt similes et fortasse eosdem" exprimentes, grave argumentum modi quo humanitas evolveret praebent (Holloway 1969). Line 154 ⟶ 152: [[Fasciculus:Bifaz-1 del Trabancos.gif\|thumb\|150px\|Bifacies non emendata]] Terentius Deacon, [[anthropologia biologica\|anthropologus biologicus]], in coniunctione plus quam viginti annorum dum evolutio humana, neurologia humana, et primatologia investigatae sunt hunc effectum scalarium describit formam "evolutionis Baldwinianae." Pro [[Iacobus Baldwin\|Iacobo Baldwin]] [[psychologia\|psychologo]] nominatum, hic vocabulum rerum statum describit qui mores animalis consecutiones evolutionarias adficit cum, [[circumiectum naturale\|circumiecta naturalia]] mutantes, mutent vires seligentes quae animal agunt (Deacon 1997:322). :<!--Once some useful behavior spreads within a population and becomes more important for subsistence, it will generate selection pressures on genetic traits that support its propagation. . . . Stone and symbolic tools, which were initially acquired with the aid of flexible ape-learning abilities, ultimately turned the tables on their users and forced them to adapt to a new niche opened by these technologies. Rather than being just useful tricks, these behavioral prostheses for obtaining food and mores sociales formare became indispensible elements in a new adaptive complex.--> Origo "humanitatis" definitur tempus in nostra evolutione ubi<!--+haec (add when the rest of the quote is Latinized)--> instrumenta facta sunt princeps selectionis in nostris corporibus cerebrisque fons. Id est "diagnosticum" ''[[Homo symbolicus\|Hominis symbolici]]'' (Deacon 1997:344). Origo "humanitatis" definitur tempus in nostra evolutione ubi<!--+haec (add when the rest of the quote is Latinized)--> instrumenta facta sunt princeps selectionis in nostris corporibus cerebrisque fons. Id est "diagnosticum" ''[[Homo symbolicus\|Hominis symbolici]]'' (Deacon 1997:344). Secundum Deacon, hoc abhinc annos inter 20 et 25 centum milia incidit, tempore primi argumenti fossilis usús instrumentorum lapideorum et initii proclivitatis auctús magnitudinis cerebri, sed evolutio linguae symbolicae est ipsa causa—et non effectus—harum proclivitatum (Deacon 1997:340). Disertius, Deacon subiecit ''[[Australopithecus\|australopitheci]],'' sicut simiis hodiernis, instrumenta usi esse; fortasse per "milionas" annorum historiae australopithecorum, multae catervae evoluisse symbolica communicationis systemata. Sola res necessaria fuit unam ex his catervis tam eius circumiecta mutare quam "introduceret selectionem pro varissimis facultatibus eruditionis quam priores species adfectae" (Deacon 1997:347). Haec caterva vel gens elaborationem Balwinianam repentine coepit—effectus scalare, qui eorum evolutionem ad genus ''[[Homo (genus)\|Hominis]]'' instigavit. Line 185 ⟶ 184: Propterea quod cognitio symbolica et communicatio et eruditio imitativa inter se consociantur (Tomasello 1999:517). Holloway lapidea cum genere ''[[Homo (genus)\|Homine]]'' consociata instrumenta eadem linguae humanae lineamenta habere arguit:~~<!--~~ "Quaevis unitas actionis in se est sine significatione sensu usús instrumenti; eae est significatio solum in contextu omnis seriei perfectae actionum quae fastigium in ultimum opere habent. Hoc subtiliter linguam aequat" (Holloway 1969:402). :Returning to matter of syntax, rules, and concatenated activity mentioned above, almost any model which describes a language process can also be used to describe tool-making. This is hardly surprising. Both activities are concatenated, both have rigid rules about eh serialization of unit activities (the grammar, syntax), both are hierarchical systems of activity (as is any motor activity), and both produce arbitrary configurations which thence become part of the environment, either temporarily or permanently (Holloway 1969:401). ~~Item:~~ :Productivity can be seen in the facts that basic types were probably used for multiple purposes, that tool industries tend to expand with time, and that a slight variation on the basic pattern may be made to meet some new functional requisite. ''Elements of a basic "vocabulary" of motor operations—flakes, detachment, rotation, preparation of striking platform, etc.—are used in different combinations to produce dissimilar tools, with different forms, and supposedly, different uses.'' . . . Taking each motor event alone, no one action is complete; each action depends on the prior one and requires a further one, and each is dependent in another way on the original plan. In other words, at each point of the action except the last, pars non est structurá "idonea."--> "Quaevis unitas actionis in se est sine significatione sensu usús instrumenti; eae est significatio solum in contextu omnis seriei perfectae actionum quae fastigium in ultimum opere habent. Hoc subtiliter linguam aequat" (Holloway 1969:402). Sicut Tomasello demonstravit, cogitatio symbolica potest operare solum in proprio contextu sociali: Line 279 ⟶ 275: [[Fasciculus:deathofcookoriginal.jpg\|thumb\|400px\|''Mors [[Iacobus Cook\|Praefecti Cook]],'' pictura a Cleveley facta: etiam [[bellum]] et caedes sunt res culturae.]] Disputatio inter symbolicos materialisticosque ad culturam accessus anthropologiam Americanans annis 1960 et 1970 dominata est. [[Bellum Vietnamiense\|Bellum autem Vietnamiense]] et editio libri ''Reinventing Anthropology,'' a [[Dell Hymes]] scripti, nuntiaverunt improbationem adituum ad culturam qui tunc obtinuerunt. Hymes dixit prima Boasiana elementa, sicut "holismus" et studium diversitatis, iam esse utilia: "studium aliorum populorum et eorum modorum vivendi, et appetitio eorum explanatorum in 'agro rationis' qui nosmet ipsos includit" (Hymes 1969:11). Praeterea, habuit anthropologos culturales esse summe ingeniosissimos facere hoc opus (cum obliqua vituperatione sociologorum sicut Parsons, qui voluit subicere anthropologiam suo proposito).~~<!--~~ :In the practice there is a traditional place for openness to phenomena in ways not predefined by theory or design – attentiveness to complex phenomena, to phenomena of interest, perhaps aesthetic, for their own sake, to the sensory as well as intellectual, aspects of the subject. These comparative and practical perspectives, though not unique to formal anthropology, are specially husbanded there, and might well be impaired, if the study of man were to be united under the guidance of others who lose touch with experience in concern for methodology, who forget the ends of social knowledge in elaborating its means, or who are unwittingly or unconcernedly culturebound (Hymes 1969:42). --> Haec sunt elementa, inquit, quae "generale hominis studium," hoc est anthropologia, fulciunt (Hymes 1969:43). Eodem tempore, Mintz, Murphy, Sahlins, Wolf, at alii anthropologi insignes, denique a vetere iudicio dissiderunt ut suscipant [[Structuralismus\|structuralisticum]] [[Marxismus\|Marxianumque]] aditus ad culturam, unde persistebant in promotione anthropologiae culturalis contra functionalismum structuralem.<ref>Mintz 1985; Murphy 1971; Sahlins 1976; Wolf 1971, 1982.</ref>

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