Quantum redactiones paginae "Utilitarismus" differant

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Quae cum ita sint, Mill ex voluptatibus mentis felicitatem exquirebat. Hic controversiae vanae de praestantia variarum mentis voluptatum facile oriuntur, nam otiosum est de gustibus disputare, utrum puta [[jazz]] praeferenda sit [[musica classica|musicae classicae]], an contra. Constat homines inter se differre. Quo igitur homine utamur arbitro? Hic Mill "iudicem competentem" suadet, scilicet hominem, qui voluptates utriusque artis expertus sit. At experientia istius iudicis in quaestionem venit, nam non est, cur omnes iudices competentes in voluptatibus diiudicandis inter se consentire exspectemus. Quae ratio utilitarismo Milliano nihilo minus congruere videtur, nam satis erit maiorem partem iudicum competentium in eadem opinione esse.
 
Mill, quamquam felicitatem summum bonum habebat, intellectum [[egoismus|egoisticum]] dissuadebat, nam felicitatem ad omnes vel quam plurimos pertinere voluit. At sunt qui Millium, cum universitatem hominum tamquam unam personam habeat, in eo reprehendant, quod homines suam quemque personam separatim gerere ignoret.<ref>Mulgan 20072014: 22.</ref> Etiam si homines suam quisque felicitatem desiderent, fieri potest, ut nemo felicitatem generalem desideret.
 
=== Sidgwick ===
Henry Sidgwick sine dubio primus philosophus moralis modernus habendus est, nam contra Benthamium et Millium philosophiam academicam profitebatur, nec magni eius intererat, qualibus consecutionibus practicis placita eius ethica implicarentur. De fonte moralitatis sciscitabatur, putabatque religionem gluten quoddam sociale esse, atque verebatur, ne utilitarismus intereat absentia religionis. Ut Bentham et Mill, hedonismo favebat sed putabat "conscientiam desiderabilem" (''desirable conscience'') summum bonum esse.
 
Methodus est, qua, quid fieri debeat, generatim describitur. A methodo ducuntur principia, quibus actiones accuratius definiuntur. De his Sidgwick in [[magnum opus|magno opere]] ''The Methods of Ethics'', anno [[1874]] edito, disserit. Moralitatem cotidianam putabat huiusmodi principiis fundatam esse. Methodum ethicam in tres partes divisit, quae sunt utilitarismus, intuitionismus ethicus, egoismus. Tum tempore maxima inter fautores utilitarismi et intuitionismi controversia erat. Sidgwick sibi proposuit, ut utilitarismi excellentiam monstraret. Itaque principia moralitatis cotidianae percensebat, [[sapientia]]m [[benevolentia]]m [[fides|fidem]] [[veritas|veritatem]] [[virtus|virtutes]] [[dignatio sui|dignationem sui]]. Quibus argumentis singillatim pertractatis negavit intuitionismum principia regularia praebere posse. Si enim sensum moralem haberemus, semper, quid agendum esset, sciremus. At nescimus, dicit, nempe sensum moralem non habemus. Accurata principia regularia solum ex utilitarismo deferri posse: quodque principium utilitarium etiam causam suam patefacere.
== Notae ==
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* Broome, John, 1991. ''Weighing Goods.'' Basil Blackwell.
* Caillé, Alain, 1989. ''Critique de la raison utilitaire.'' La Découverte.
* Dancy, Jonathan, 2000. Mill's Puzzling Footnote. ''Utilitas'' 12:219.
* Davidson, William L., 1915. ''Political Thought in England. The Utilitarians from Bentham to J. S. Mill.'' Williams & Norgate.
* Feldman, Fred, 1993. On the Consistency of Act- and Motive-Utilitarianism: A Reply to Robert Adams. ''Philosophical Studies'' 70: 201–212.
* Feldman, Fred, 2004. ''Pleasure and the Good Life.'' Clarendon Press.
* Feldman, Fred, 2010. ''What is this thing called Happiness?'' Oxford University Press.
* Gauthier, David, 1963. ''Practical Reasoning: The Structure and Foundations of Prudential and Moral Arguments and Their Exemplification in Discourse.'' Oxford University Press.
* Gesang, Bernward, 2003. ''Eine Verteidigung des Utilitarismus.'' Reclam.
* Gibbard, Alan, 1990. ''Wise Choices, Apt Feelings.'' Harvard University Press. * Glover, Jonathan, 1977. ''Causing Death and Saving Lives. The Moral Problems of Abortion, Infanticide, Suicide, Euthanasia, Capital Punishment, War and Other Life-or-death Choices.'' Penguin Books.
* Goodin, Robert E., 1991. Utility and the good. ''The Blackwell Companion to Ethics'', ed. Peter Singer, cap. 20. Blackwell.
* Goodin, Robert E., 1995. ''Utilitarianism as a Public Philosophy.'' Cambridge University Press.
* Gray, John, 1989. Indirect Utility and Fundamental Rights. ''Liberalisms: Essays in Political Philosophy.'' Routledge.
* Halevy, Elie, 1966. ''The Growth of Philosophic Radicalism.'' Beacon Press.
* Hall, Everett W., 1949. The 'Proof' of Utility in Bentham and Mill. ''Ethics'' 60: 1–18.
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* Harwood, Sterling, 2003. Eleven Objections to Utilitarianism. ''Moral Philosophy: A Reader,'' ed. Louis P. Pojman. Hackett Publishing Co.
* Hooker, Brad, 2002. ''Ideal Code, Real World: A Rule-Consequentialist Theory of Morality.'' Clarendon Press.
* Howey, Richard, 1965. ''The Rise of the Marginal Utility School.'' Columbia University Press.
* Irwin, T. H., 2011. ''The Development of Ethics,'' III: ''From Kant to Rawls''. Oxford University Press.
* Kagan, Shelly, 1991. ''The Limits of Morality.'' Clarendon Press.
* Kagan, Shelly, 1984. Does Consequentialism Demand too Much? Recent Work on the Limits of Obligation. ''Philosophy & Public Affairs'' 13(3).
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[[Categoria:Philosophia socialis]]
[[Categoria:Theoriae ethicae]]
[[Categoria:Utilitarianismus| ]]