Quantum redactiones paginae "Dilemma captivi" differant

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== Interpretatio ==
Captivi hoc modo ratiocinari possunt: "Si alterum defecero tacente eo, incolumis dimittar. Sin autem defecero deficiente altero, annos duo (pro tribus) in carcere ero. Ergo, deficiendo trium annorum poenam utique evitabo." Attamen animadvertendum est, alterum captivum eadem ratiocinatione usurum esse. Uterque, si ipse rationaliter egerit, alter alterum deficiet et annos duo in carcere erit. Quod strategema [[aequilibrium Nash]] exhibet, namque hic status ludi optimum est, quod uterque sua ratione usus consequi potest. Sin autem ambo cooperantes tacuerint, unum tantum annum uterque in vinculis retinebitur. Docet quidem theoria ludorum, lusores primo tempore non cooperari. Attamen sunt, qui naturalem cooperandi propensionem hominibus esse dicant.<ref>Fehr & Fischbacher (2003).</ref> Sed natura strategica dilemmatis captivi non patefit, antequam ab eisdem lusoribus repetitur.
 
 
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== Bibliographia ==
* Fehr, Ernst & Fischbacher, Urs (2003) The Nature of human altruism. ''Nature'' 425 (6960): 785–791.
* Harford, T. & Solomon, L. (1967) "Reformed sinner" and "lapsed saint": strategies i the prisoner's dilemma game. ''Journal of Coflict Resolution'' 11: 104-109.
* Kuhn, Steven (2014) Prisoner's Dilemma. ''The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy'' (ed. Edward N. Zalta), URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2014/entries/prisoner-dilemma/>.
* Luce,R.Duncan & Raiffa, Howard (1957) ''Games and decisions. Introduction and critical survey.'' New York: Wiley.